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I Introduction
The general idea of our constitution is that Parliament has full power to make any law that it deems necessary to make.
2 This paper's central thesis is that, even if this is true, our elected legislature should not exercise that power to legislate for judicial review. The main reason for this is as simple as it is, frankly, basic: the fusion of executive and legislature is so advanced in New Zealand that politically ceding the power to regulate judicial review to Parliament is to cede it also to the executive. That the executive could direct how a judge should determine the legality of its actions is undesirable in a system where the rule of law is the "guiding light of constitutional propriety."
3
The closely related question of whose role it is to administer and define judicial review in New Zealand is of substantial significance. I will explain why I am deeply sceptical of parliamentary interference in judicial review with close reference to the omnibus Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013. The Bill is an excellent example of an inexpert legislature wasting an opportunity to make good on known issues. It is not enough to cite the Bill's moderate successes in the unambitious goal of nonsubstantive reform as justification for that lapse. There was highly inadequate 1 legislative scrutiny in the process of passing the Judicature Modernisation Bill. This raises questions of whether Parliament has enough control over the content of legislation, such that the legislation it passes can be seen as passed by Parliament at all. 4 My criticisms are rooted in a commitment to the rule of law, which I and others believe to be underappreciated in New Zealand. 5 As such, the Judicature Modernisation Bill is a timely example of why Parliament needs to tread carefully when legislating for constitutional essentials.
I will go on to discuss the nature of judicial review as a common law power.
Because judicial review's origins lie in the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, there is a basic tension with any view that argues Parliament is lawfully sovereign.
It is not enough to sidestep this conflict as resoluble with a deft touch of statutory interpretation. 6 Even if Parliament was a perfect legislator, it makes little sense to speak of a legislative intent to enable judicial review. For the most part, Parliament has not turned its mind to judicial review process, and arguments for implied intention mask the historical nature of review as a tool fashioned by courts. The implications of these insights for statutory amendments to review process is that Parliament is, essentially, meddling. Accordingly, Parliament needs to rethink the role it plays in establishing judicial review process in order to better protect the power of review. Whether that role is the same but subject to more cautious processes, or a refusal to use legislative power, is perhaps not too important. Either would be a better protection for judicial review than undue interference.
This paper comes from a generally instrumental perspective. In my view, the main value of public law is its role as moderator of public power in a broad sense.
But public power depends on its perceived legitimacy, which in turn depends on exercised authority not exceeding proper bounds. Therefore, in making my argument I am conscious the judiciary cannot overreach if it is to retain its respect. However, the same must be said of Parliament. The first principle of our constitution is not that Parliament is sovereign, it is that "no principle should be over-stressed or pushed to its limits." 8 That insight is part of what animates the principles of comity, and it is not a one-way street. Parliament may be our supreme law-making power, but that is different from saying it is the only one that must be respected. Current parliamentary attitudes to judicial review err too closely to the latter view.
II Background to the Judicature Modernisation Bill
The Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 entered the Parliamentary agenda when it was introduced to the House on 27 November 2013. 9 The Bill had been a part of an intensive study at the Law Commission since the 2010 request of then-Minister of Justice Simon Power. The purpose of the review was quite straightforward:
modernisation and reorganisation of the Judicature Act 1908, not reform as such.
Substantive change or revisiting of "major matters of policy" in the law of the courts and civil procedure was explicitly not within the terms of reference.
10
Rather than addressing judicial review, most of the Judicature Modernisation
Bill concerns enactments required following repeal of the Judicature Act 1908.
These enactments notably include the establishment of a unitary District Court, increased provision for the online publishing of judgments, and the potential for a commercial list in the High Court. By contrast, the terms of reference contained in Law Commission, above n 10, at 4; see also Appendix 3.
described as the universal intention of all parties--nobody is attempting a backdoor reform. Yet, worthy of note is the caveat deployed by the Commission that the Judicature Modernisation Bill generally is not a "pure" consolidation where the substantive law could be certified as not changing at all.
18

III What Reform?
I turn now to part three of the Judicature Modernisation Bill and analyse some of the major points of contention in the statutory language. Although the substantive operation of the law as relates to judicial review procedure is not meant to change, the way it looks certainly will. There is one exception: rights of appeal against interlocutory orders are curtailed to an uncertain extent. This paper focuses on major areas of debate to illustrate that general picture.
A Troubleshooting the Idea of "Non-Substantive Reform" Per Se
To begin, cl 423 of the Bill explicitly provides an uncontroversial and wellsettled purpose for the proposed stand-alone Act:
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As it appears here, cl 423 is a powerful statement of purpose that should correct any especially technical reading of the Judicature Modernisation Bill that may arise. It channels the essence of the Judicature Amendment Act as a mostly-procedural enactment. 20 For the most part, only minor language changes have been made to it, to reflect modern drafting practice. Even where the language may seem expansively different, the effect in terms of substantive law change is likely to be construed quite narrowly to respect this purpose section. As such, it is a useful statutory aid.
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At iv-v. Further, the purpose clause is limited to changes of language in the provisions that are re-enacted. That is, the language of provisions in the Judicature Modernisation Bill are not intended to alter the interpretations of those provisions as they appeared in the Judicature Amendment Act. The omitting of a clause is hardly comparable to a change in style or organisation of language. An omitted provision is not a 'reorganised provision in the Bill' in other than a sparse legalistic sense. It is a stretch to claim the lack of statutory language relating to, for example, the s 4(2A) proviso can be read as having the same effect as the positive statutory language that it had in the old Act. In falling outside that purpose clause, each omitted section has the possibility, depending on its content, to change the substantive law.
Purpose clauses in the manner of cl 423 will never be a complete solution to problems of statutory drafting. The overall result is that when done badly the effects of so-called non-substantive or technical reform can be too unclear to be workable, especially when reliant on these clauses. This is not merely about being technically correct. That a proviso is unnecessary or omitted provisions are included elsewhere is rather beside the point. This incompleteness of coverage in the purpose clause demonstrates a defect in the Bill's law reform process per se.
B Notable Changes in Drafting
Provisions proclaiming the best of intentions cannot overcome defects in legislative drafting, which are more likely to occur the more this method of reform is attempted. Something more is required from our legislators. For the most part, fortunately, there are few issues in the modernisation and redrafting of the Judicature Amendment Act.
Because judicial review is intended to be an expeditious review of the exercise of public power, the courts' continued power of review is central. Commission's view that it is difficult to construe the section as enlarging or modifying the grounds for review seems well-founded. 34 Clause 437 effectively reenacts s 4(5)-(5C) as they relate to the direction of the decision-maker subject to review proceedings. Clause 438 preserves the discretionary nature of relief as it exists under the Judicature Amendment Act. 35 Though the reorganisation of language is occasionally quite extreme, read in the light of the purpose clause it is unlikely that powers of the court contained in s 4 will change. 
C Rights of Appeal Curtailed?
There is, naturally, a caveat. Not every change made is harmless. The purpose clause is not all-inclusive; in fact, on closer inspection it appears to be something more like a sieve. It only covers "reorganisation in this Part of those provisions, and the changes made to their style and language". The new cl 57 makes changes in the substantive law of judicial review procedure, despite being amended to account for interlocutory appeals where they would strike out, dismiss, or grant summary judgment in respect of a claim. 48 Given that judicial review tends to be a quick process ordinarily, the exceptions under cl 57(3) may have limited effect. Where there is a live issue that needs resolution, an injunction to maintain the position of the parties will not be able to be appealed.
Depending on time-frames involved, this may have the effect of practically resolving the core of a complaint. Such changes to appeal rights ought to be avoided. 49 Nonetheless, this is a substantive change to judicial review procedure.
Whilst the Ministry of Justice was correct to identify that this was not a change contemplated by part three of the Bill, their assurances are less than comforting.
The object of the Bill, as it relates to judicial review, was to avoid substantive reform of any kind. This is substantive reform. Therefore, the object of the Bill has been demonstrably compromised. Additionally, side-stepping consequential reform by saying it is the result of a reference to a reformed provision in the proposed Senior Courts Bill does not inspire full confidence that the entire Judicature Modernisation Bill has been vetted properly to ensure minimal substantive reform will occur. The exact sources of any changes are not relevant, because the public has been assured that there is no material change in substance. The ordinary observer, even a technically skilled one, does not have the resources to confidently second-guess such claims. It is important that their faith is not abused.
Nonetheless, other than cl 57, there is no likely legal change to judicial review processes and powers. I have surveyed here only some of the more obvious changes in statutory language for reasons of space, but the pattern in these changes is clear.
The law of judicial review procedure remains substantively the same as it was under the Judicature Amendment Act. The exception is cl 57, the effect of which is uncertain. To the extent the statutory language is distinct it is highly likely to be caught within the expansive purpose clause, preventing change in the law. Although I have shown the purpose clause to be defective, the courts will be unlikely to willingly curtail judicial review. That judicial attitude will have to be enough.
IV Proper Reform Process
Saying the Judicature Modernisation Bill has more or less succeeded in a modest project of non-substantive, or purely visual, reform should not be construed as an endorsement of the attempt. I now turn to the process by which the Bill has moved through the legislature. Although Parliament can in theory make any law it pleases, not all processes are created equal. For present purposes, scrutiny is probably the most important paradigm they refer to. I will focus on scrutiny because it is closely connected with quality drafting, and because both together demonstrate appropriate levels of caution. They are all obviously interrelated.
Under that framework the process used to reform part three of the Judicature Modernisation Bill is deficient for a bill of such constitutional significance in at least two ways. First, the idea of "non-substantive reform" and over-reliance on legislative intentions reduce the probability of clear and reliable reform, lack of parliamentary examination undermined the criteria of transparency and scrutiny. Additionally, the attempt at so-called "non-substantive reform" is usually a waste of an opportunity to address already identified proposals for reform. These together suggest that Parliament should tread carefully when reforming or adopting constitutional basics in general, and judicial review in particular. Judicial review is far too important to get wrong.
A Value of Good Scrutiny in Legislative Process
For legislation, "[q]uality can be an elusive idea but it does not, like beauty, lie in the eye of the beholder." 51 It is important to distinguish good or desirable law from effective law in order to emphasise that scrutiny is more about the latter.
Effective reform processes will maximise the probability of producing effective law. By contrast, there will be a degree of agnosticism about whether the results of a reform are worthwhile or desirable. That is for legislators to judge and not the legal process itself.
The Judicature Modernisation Bill, as it relates to judicial review at least, is an example of mixed results in the reform process. Although it had reasonable prelegislative scrutiny--largely defining the parameters of the current reform--this was never second-guessed by Members of Parliament. That politicians should occasionally trust the experts is proper. The issue is rather more that there was no opportunity for the question of trust to arise, because the process of the Judicature Modernisation Bill as an omnibus bill radically limited parliamentary consideration.
Examination of legislation is a crucial part of any legislative process. It has essentially two main purposes. Firstly, scrutiny is essential to the public reform of the law and enhances its legitimacy as law. Adversely, an obvious lack of scrutiny undermines the public's trust in the law and the institution of Parliament generally. 52 Whilst important in its own right, public confidence in legislation is not strictly the subject of this paper. But the second reason scrutiny is important is more relevant; a good legislative process is one of the most obvious ways to rectify 51 Palmer, above n 1, at 3. Such generality of submissions is insufficient overall when legislating for judicial review. The process the Bill has gone through seems automatic and superficial, focussing instead on headline political issues like criminal sentencing and online courts. That this criticism is not new is additionally discouraging.
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There is limited basis for concluding that scrutiny of the Bill's effects on judicial review were adequate.
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C Improving Reform Processes
The nature of the Judicature Modernisation Bill and its attempted non-reform appear to be intended to be a temporary measure designed to prolong the status quo until a proper review of judicial review is undertaken. 75 This is not an excuse for ineffective scrutinising of the Bill. Fortunately, improving reform procedures is a rather straightforward affair.
In general, constitutional reformers should avoid omnibus bills. by omnibus bill, even a well-drafted constitutional bill will become lost in the other parts of the bill, as has happened here with the Judicature Modernisation Bill. Standalone bills are better because they improve the transparency and publicness of a bill.
They invite better examination.
Good scrutiny will never overcome the problems of ill-considered legislation.
That is, New Zealand has a problem with over-legislating. 80 We tend to legislate in large statutes; yet we will tinker without principles around the edges when we do not like the results. 81 We also tend to legislate for things that do not require legislation at all. 82 These habits contribute significantly to the Parliamentary workload--the 'legislative bottle-neck'--incentivising cursory analysis in order to facilitate the appearance of getting things done. 83 A degree of caution about codification and statutory construction is necessary, so as to not make regrettable mistakes that will need repair later. It is also better not to legislate at all if it is not needed. Getting it right will free up Parliamentary time for more important and relevant matters, and provide more resources to use on legislative scrutiny. Certainly, no reform is likely to be fully scrutinised to the utmost extent.
Effective scrutiny is more of an ideal towards which we aim. However, that success is an ideal does not justify continual failure; reform can be done better if done in public and for the right reasons.
V Parliament Should Tread Carefully When Using Legislative Power
Need for adequate scrutiny is in the foreground of any structural reform of the New Zealand state. Analysis on legislative process above was defined by the simple idea that the boundaries of the public sphere and public power should be set by a clear and accessible process. The constitution is a public document that should not be altered inadvertently, capriciously, or in secret. 84 Similarly, to aid quality reform Parliament should show deference to the courts on such matters as judicial review and judicial independence. This is not a challenge to the claimed full powers of Parliament to make law, but an argument for additional respect or deference to matters relating to the common law powers of the courts. It is animated by a desire to secure independent administration of the law of judicial review, and the spirit of comity.
The fundamental basis of the power of Parliament is found in the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Many theories of the rule of law explicitly hold that, ideally, the law governs all equally and independently of their role in society.
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Similarly, democracy is often argued to decentralise political power. 86 Both of these separately require that the state is subject to law at the suit of a private citizen, which is only achievable when a judge can rule against the government "without fear or favour". 87 Making application of the law independent from its administration or creation is the very first condition of a system that functionally follows either Debate between the ultra vires models and common law illegality models of review is unresolved. 96 It is not possible, nor necessary, to undertake a suitably thorough review of the common law illegality and ultra vires models of review in this paper. Nonetheless, such debate is not merely academic. The strong corollary of an ultra vires interpretation is that the proper role of review, besides to prevent material errors of law, is to ensure that discretion of administrators is exercised in accordance with Parliament's manifest or presumed intention. Yet upholding Parliament's intention is not the same as upholding fundamental principles like the rule of law. Given the instrumental objection above, that Parliament is controlled by the executive, the ultra vires model has ramifications for potential efficacy of review as a check on executive power.
If there is no statute creating judicial review, then this suggests that the courts did so through the ordinary process of precedent, regardless of their justifications for doing so. The major advantage of parliamentary caution is that it makes clearer the constitutional tightrope Parliament walks when it legislates for the basics. As a political rather than legal settlement, it avoids problematic power transfers to the courts--but at the cost of not necessarily resolving the underlying theoretical problem that Parliament is sovereign. 100 Increased scrutiny of the tensions between legislature and judiciary may be enough to prevent an abuse of legislative power;
equally, however, it may simply mean we see the abuses coming more easily.
Nothing about a convention of deference ensures deference will occur. For now, it 98 Allan, above n 6, at 207. 
VI What Good Reform May Look Like
It would be remiss to criticise the Judicature Modernisation Bill's processes and substance without some sort of analysis as to potential legislative alternatives. This paper provides one potential solution, but it means a political willingness to cede power to legislate for judicial review. I argue that Parliament should provide that judicial review exists, and leave the common law to its own devices. So far, I have established the importance of judicial review, and why Parliament should therefore be careful not to break it. As one of the pre-eminent tools in the public law space, it remains a multifaceted and useful--if sporadic--tool used to protect administrative process from governmental overreach. 105 Frequently, it is a safeguard against simple executive mistake.
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See by way of example Cooke, above n 99; Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394 at 398, per Cooke J; Elias, above n 2. 102 Palmer, "New Zealand Constitutional Culture", above n 3, at 582-589. 103 Geiringer, Higbee and McLeay, above n 50, at 19. 104 Palmer, "New Zealand Constitutional Culture", above n 3, at 585-586. Specific remedies to these issues may be achieved through statutory reform, whether of the qualification of what constitutes a "statutory power" or to recreate an alternative tribunal process for grievances arising out of non-public decisions.
The potential content of such reforms is not the focus of this paper. Rather, a statusquo re-enactment has done nothing to resolve these previously identified issues.
That insight is in itself not new.
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Statutory solutions are generally unsuitable for judicial review. Statutory drafting, like chess, "requires participants, each time they need to make a decision, to consider many relevant factors. Thus, in both activities every move has many implications." 114 Given that judicial review is a legal tool of some constitutional delicacy, it remains ever-important to implement certain and stable reform. The statutory remedies required to reform judicial review would mostly tend to the technical and the specific, and are demonstrably unlikely to receive the scrutiny they deserve. At least, they are likely to receive a similarly cursory consideration to the Judicature Modernisation Bill. Accordingly, there is a chance that any reform would be in error. Even if successful, it would be to fix the development of the judicial review power in a way that was possibly undesirable.
Nor is it safe to argue that any problem for judicial review stemming from legislative action may be resolved by careful statutory interpretation. 
VII Conclusions
This paper arose out of an enduring desire for quality law reform. I am reassured not to see the errors in the Judicature Modernisation Bill that I initially feared.
Rather, the Bill is by-and-large a technically competent re-enactment of the Judicature Act 1908, including as it relates to judicial review. Curtailment of appeal rights is a blot on the record of attempts at non-substantive reform, but in itself is a policy decision the Government is entitled to make. Therefore, on the whole, the Bill is reasonable. But it is also a Bill passed under dangerously low levels of parliamentary scrutiny. As I have shown, assurances that there would be no changes whatever are inaccurate. Because of the opaque nature of that lapse, it was not immediately obvious what was to be changed for judicial review--not to the wider public, at any rate. This is a shame, because these changes needed to be seen. 116 Palmer, "New Zealand Constitutional Culture", above n 3, at 589. I have discussed the Bill as an example of an attempt at "non-substantive" reform of judicial review procedure. Although it is likely to be successful in this unambitious target, such an attempt was in the first place misguided due to the incomplete protection afforded by a purpose clause. In making that critique I advanced an argument for parliamentary caution or deference when legislating for constitutional fundamentals, in spite of its legal ability to make any law it pleases.
A necessary part of such caution is that bills go through proper and thorough scrutiny prior to receiving the royal assent. For that reason, omnibus bills are to be avoided when passing constitutional legislation.
Similarly, judicial review maintains its important position in public law because it is one of the most prominent means for citizens to enforce their procedural rights against the Executive. It is not appropriate that Parliament retains the political mandate to legislate away the basis of review proceedings or otherwise restrict their availability carte blanche. There is a palpable tension between the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty that must abate. It is unseemly for parliamentarians to ask us to rely on their conscience for such fundamentals.
It is, in the end, a debate about who should have the final word on judicial review. When legislating for the constitutional basics, Members of Parliament should do so for the right reasons and in the eyes of the public. There needs to be a certain regard for the principle of comity and the obligations it imposes on all branches of government to respect each other. In particular, since the executive largely controls the legislative agenda in practice, the legislative agenda should not extend to judicial review of executive action. Good legislative process will sometimes necessitate deference. To err too much may earn judicial animosity. If the thin veil between law and politics is pierced, the rule of law will likely be the first victim. We must avoid such a breakdown in relations.
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